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Prejudice Presumed: The Decision to




On March I, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Florida v. Nixon' to decide whether claims of ineffective assistance
based on defense counsel's concessions to lesser offenses during opening
statements are properly analyzed under Strickland v. Washington' or
whether prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic.3
This Note urges the Court to adopt a rule requiring lower courts to pre-
sume prejudice in cases where defense counsel concedes guilt to lesser-
included offenses during opening statements. Concessions of guilt during
opening statements relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof, and
therefore, prejudice should be presumed. On the other hand, concessions
made during closing arguments may serve as an acknowledgement of
overwhelming evidence already presented against the defendant, and
should not be deemed presumptively prejudicial without further inquiry
into the facts and circumstances of the case.
Part I of this Note examines the history of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, beginning with lower court inter-
pretations of effective assistance and culminating in the Supreme Court
decision in Strickland and its companion decision Cronic. Strickland out-
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004, B.A., Tufts Uni-
versity, 1998. The Author would like to thank everyone involved in 2002-2003 National Appellate
Advocacy Competition and, in particular, Thomas Wallace for inspiring this Note. The Author would
also like to thank Jeffrey Kahan and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their editorial advice.
i. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2ooo), cert. granted sub nom., Florida v. Nixon, 72
U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Mar. I, 2004) (No. 03-931).
2. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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lined a two-prong test requiring the defendant to show both that defense
counsel acted improperly, and that the deficient performance prejudiced
his case.4 Cronic provided three circumstances in which prejudice should
be presumed.' This Part outlines these three "exceptions" to the preju-
dice requirement. 6 Part II analyzes Cronic's second exception to the
prejudice requirement.7 Under this exception, the defendant need not
prove prejudice if defense counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecu-
tion's case to meaningful adversarial testing.' Part III considers whether
concessions of guilt to lesser offenses amount to an entire failure of
meaningful adversarial testing. In particular it examines the Fifth Circuit
case of Haynes v. Cain,9 as well as two state court decisions: Nixon v.
Singletary"° and Kansas v. Carter." The section distinguishes between
concessions made during opening statements and concessions made dur-
ing closing arguments. This Note proposes that concessions made during
opening statements amount to a complete failure of meaningful
adversarial testing because defense counsel relieves the prosecution of
their burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Cronic's second
exception should apply, and prejudice should be presumed. Concessions
made during closing arguments, on the other hand, do not require a pre-
sumption of prejudice under Cronic.2 Finally, the Note briefly examines
concessions made during trial, but after opening statements. 3
4. 466 U.S. at 687.




9. 298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002).
1O. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Florida v. Nixon, 72 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S.
Mar. I, 2004) (No. 03-93 I).
II. 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 2000).
12. 466 U.S. at 659 (noting in dicta that an entire failure of meaningful adversarial testing results
in a presumption of prejudice).
13. This Note raises a number of procedural questions, including whether it is appropriate for a
judge to declare a mistrial if defense counsel concedes guilt to a lesser-included offenses without the
defendant's consent; the proper method for courts to use to determine whether defense counsel has
obtained the defendant's consent; and a number of related issues. While these are important proce-
dural considerations facing lower courts, there resolution is beyond the scope of this Note.
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I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. PRE-1984 STANDARDS FOR CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
The Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall.. . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' 4
"It has long been recognized that the right to assistance of counsel is the
right to effective assistance of counsel."' 5 Prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic, the
lower courts debated the meaning of effective assistance of counsel. 6
Courts developed different standards with regard to both the standard of
attorney performance and level of prejudice required for a new trial.'7
With regard to attorney performance, lower courts applied rules varying
from the "farce-and-mockery" standard'8 to the "reasonable compe-
tence" standard. 9 With regard to the level of prejudice required for a
new trial, courts took a wide variety of positions, ranging from the "out-
come-determinative" test to rules requiring no prejudice at all."
B. THE TwO-PRONG TEST UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the case of Strickland v. Wash-
ington.2' In Strickland, the Court held that a two-prong test generally ap-
plies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." First, the defendant
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
90 (955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 6o, 69-7o (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446
(i94o); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
i6. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I7. Id. at 713-14.
18. Id. at 713 (asserting that the farce-and-mockery standard required the defendant to show that
the attorney's performance was so ineffective that it could be characterized as amounting to a farce,
sham, or mockery of justice which shocks the court); see also State v. Pacheco, 588 P.2d 83o, 833 (Ariz.
1978); Hoover v. State, 6o6 S.W.2d 749,751 (Ark. i98o); Line v. State, 397 N.E.2d 975,976 (Ind. 1979).
19. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 714. (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-3o (9 th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
20. Id. at 712-14 (citing United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 2o8 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Knight
v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, oot (Fla. 1981) with regard to the outcome-determinative test and United
States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863,865 n.i (6th Cir. 1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th
Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Badger, 393 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. 1978) with regard to rules requiring no
showing of prejudice); see also Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying the
"Beasley Standard" to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an attorney's concessions
to lesser offenses at trial).
21. 466 U.S 668. Strickland held that defense counsel's decision not to present certain evidence
during the sentencing hearing, and not to request a pre-sentence report did not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 699-7oo.
22. Id. at 687.
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must show that defense counsel's performance was deficient.23 A strong
presumption that defense counsel's actions were within the "wide range
of reasonable professional assistance" exists. 4 Second, the defendant
must demonstrate that the deficient performance prejudiced his or her
case.2 5 To prove prejudice, the defendant must show that the outcome of
the trial would have been different had counsel not performed in a defi-
cient manner. 6 As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, "The purpose
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defen-
dant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding." 7 Thus, the defendant must show that there was a "reason-
able probability that the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.""
C. PRESUMING PREJUDICE UNDER UNITED STATES V. CRONIC
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Strickland, the Court
held in United States v. Cronic that prejudice should be presumed in cer-
tain circumstances. 9 In Cronic, the defendant had been convicted of mail
fraud.3" The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.' The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that, based on the evidence considered by the appellate
court, defense counsel's performance was not presumptively prejudicial.32
The Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to determine whether
the defendant could make out a claim for actual ineffective assistance.33
The Court also outlined three specific circumstances in which preju-
dice should be presumed.34 First, a presumption of prejudice is warranted
where there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 689.
25. Id. at 687.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 691-92.
28. Id. at 694 ("A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.").
29. 466 U.S. 648, 658.
30. Id. at 650-52. At trial, the defendant was represented by a young court-appointed real estate
attorney. Id. at 649. Though it had taken the government over four years to review the case, he had
only twenty-five days to prepare for trial. Id.
31. Id. at 652. The Tenth Circuit inferred that the right to ineffective assistance had been violated
based upon: "(i) the time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3)
the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses
to counsel." Id.
32. Id. at 666.
33. Id. at 667.
34. Id. at 659. See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
1Vo1. 55:965
PREJUDICE PRESUMED
trial. 5 Second, prejudice should be presumed where counsel "entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.,,
6
Third, in those cases where "although counsel is available to assist the
accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully compe-
tent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption
of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
trial."37 Under these circumstances the defendant need not prove preju-
dice because they are "so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified."' In addition to
these three specific situations, the Court noted in both Strickland and
35. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. With regard to the first exception, courts have applied Cronic in cases
where no attorney is present at all. See id. at 659 n.25 ("The Court has uniformly found constitutional
error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from as-
sisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.") (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 6o5, 612-13
(1972); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
692 ("Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result
in prejudice."). They have also applied Cronic's first exception where the attorney is constructively
absent during a critical phase of the trial. See, e.g., Rickman v. Bell, i31 F.3 d iI5O, 1I6o (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that trial counsel's failure to advocate defendant's cause and repeated expressions of hostility
toward defendant amounted to constructive denial of effective assistance of counsel); see also Tippins
v. Walker 77 F. 3 d 682, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1996); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3 d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001):
Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of why an attorney that
sleeps throughout critical stages of the trial warrants a presumption of prejudice see Mathew J. Fogel-
man, Justice Asleep is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense Attorney's Demean the Sixth Amendment
and Should be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67 (2ooi).
36. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. With regard to Cronic's second exception, courts have held that the
defense counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing where
defense counsel concedes guilt to the only factual issues in dispute. See, e.g., United States v. Swanson,
943 F.2d 1070. 1074 (9th Cir. I991) ("A lawyer who informs the jury that it is his view of the evidence
that there is no reasonable doubt regarding the only factual issues that are in dispute has utterly failed
to 'subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."') (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659).
37. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 (citing Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308 (974)). No specific showing
of prejudice was necessary in Davis v. Alaska because the petitioner had been "denied the right of ef-
fective cross-examination" which "would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount
of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Id. (citations omitted). The Court also cited Powell v.
Alabama as an example of a situation "in which the surrounding circumstances made it so unlikely that
any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness was properly presumed without in-
quiry into actual performance at trial." Id. at 66I (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72(1932)).
In Powell, six days before trial, the judge appointed all of the members of the Tennessee Bar to repre-
sent the defendants at their arraignment. At trial, a single attorney appeared, but indicated that he was
unwilling to represent the defendants. The trial judge apparently allowed the attorney to appear on
behalf the defendants with whatever help he could gain from other members of the bar, but appointed
no individual attorney on their behalf. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53-58.
38. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (stating that prejudice in the cir-
cumstances identified in Cronic are "so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the
cost"). Several courts have noted that the discussion of the presumption of prejudice in Cronic consti-
tuted dicta because the Court held that the exceptions did not apply. See, e.g., People v. Valdez, 789
P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. i9o); Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 115, 1135 (Ind. 1997).
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Cronic that the defendant is entitled to a limited presumption of preju-
dice in cases where there is a conflict of interest.
39
II. CRoNlC'S SECOND EXCEPTION: THE ENTIRE FAILURE OF
MEANINGFUL ADVERSARIAL TESTING
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN BELL V. CONE
In Bell v. Cone, the Supreme Court recently reconsidered Cronic's
second exception. The Court held that in order for the exception to ap-
ply, defense counsel must entirely fail to subject the prosecutions' case to
meaningful adversarial testing.4' In Bell, the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to death for the murder of an elderly couple." During the sen-
tencing hearing, defense counsel failed to call certain witnesses and
elected to waive the closing argument.42 The defendant petitioned the
State for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of the trial. 3
He contended that defense counsel had "rendered ineffective assistance
during the sentencing hearing by failing to present mitigating evidence
and by waiving final argument."' The defendant further argued that de-
fense counsel's actions warranted a presumption of prejudice under
Cronic's second exception because defense counsel had "failed to mount
some case for life" during the sentencing hearing.45
The Court rejected defendant's claim, noting, "When we spoke in
Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's
failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's fail-
ure must be complete. '' ,6 The Court further explained that the defendant
had contended that his defense counsel had failed to test the prosecu-
tion's case at specific points rather than throughout the trial, and thus did
not amount to an entire failure. 7 The Court distinguished the rule of
Strickland from the exceptions outlined in Cronic, stating that the differ-
39. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (i98o)); Cronic, 466
U.S. at 662 n.3I.
40. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002). A complete failure is one that occurs throughout the
entire proceeding. Id.
41. Id. at 689.
42. Id. at 700-01. While Bell dealt with the sentencing phase of the trial, Bell's holding applies
equally to both the guilt and the sentencing phase of a trial. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4
(2003) (per curiam).
43. Bell, 535 U.S. at 692.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 696.
46. Id. at 696-97.
47. Id. at 697.
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ence "is not of degree but of kind."' Where the error is "of the same ilk"
as other attorney errors that the Court has specifically subjected to
Strickland, a presumption of prejudice is inappropriate.49 The Court con-
cluded that the state court had properly chosen to apply the Strickland
standard. 0
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens argued that defense counsel's ac-
tions in the case warranted a presumption of prejudice under Cronic be-
cause defense counsel had entirely failed to subject the prosecution's
case to meaningful adversarial testing." Justice Stevens cited three spe-
cific failures of defense counsel: the failure to interview witnesses who
could have provided mitigating evidence, the failure to present mitigating
evidence, and the waiver of closing argument. 2 He reasoned that these
errors, coupled with the fact that defense counsel was subsequently diag-
nosed with a mental illness that rendered him unqualified to practice law
and that apparently led to his suicide, justified "a presumption that re-





Under Justice Stevens' rationale, three general policy reasons exist
for presuming prejudice when counsel has entirely failed to function as
the government's adversary. First, the complete failure to advocate "un-
dermines Strickland's basic assumption: that counsel has 'made all sig-
nificant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."'54
Strickland assumes that defense attorneys will act in an ethical manner.
The prejudice requirement protects defense attorney's strategic decisions
where their conduct is ethically questionable but the verdict is nonethe-
less reliable. Conceding guilt to a lesser-included offense without the de-
fendant's consent is ethically unreasonable.5 It also renders the verdict
inherently unreliable by depriving the jury of their ability to decide the
issue of guilt as to the lesser-included offense. Therefore, a presumption
of prejudice is warranted.
Second, proving prejudice is more difficult when defense counsel
abdicates her role as an advocate for the defendant, "because the abdica-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 697-98 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986); Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776,788 (1987)).
51. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,689 (1984)).
52. Id. at 703.
53. Id. at 703-04 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662).
54. Id. at 717-18 (citations omitted).
55. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically provide that the lawyer shall abide by
the defendant's decision as to what plea to enter. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
See also notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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tion results in an incomplete trial record from which a court cannot
properly evaluate whether a defendant has suffered prejudice from the
attorney's conduct.,16 This argument is particularly relevant in cases
where defense counsel concedes guilt to a lesser-included offense during
opening statements. In these cases, defense counsel will not test the
prosecution's case as to the lesser-included offense. As a result, the re-
cord will likely be absent of the evidence necessary to prove prejudice.
Third, Justice Stevens noted that the main policy reason behind
Cronic was that "counsel's total failure as an adversary renders the like-
lihood that the verdict is unreliable to be so high that a case-by-case in-
quiry is unnecessary."57 Stressing the importance of the right to effective
representation in capital cases, Justice Stevens further stated, "Effective
representation provides 'the means through which the other rights of the
person on trial are secured."'' 8 Bell's holding appears to ignore this final
rationale by requiring Strickland's fact-based inquiry in all but the most
narrow circumstances. This result is particularly unjust where defense
counsel concedes guilt to a lesser-included offense without first obtaining
the defendant's consent. In such cases, defense counsel not only fails to
maintain her role as the prosecution's adversary, but also explicitly de-
nies the defendant the opportunity to assert one of her most fundamental
rights-the right to plead not guilty.
Bell makes clear that under Cronic's second exception the failure to
test the prosecution's case must be complete. 9 In order to amount to a
complete failure, the defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel
failed to test the prosecution's case throughout the trial.6o In circum-
stances where this has not occurred, the defendant faces the uphill battle
of proving not only that her counsel acted in an unprofessional manner,
but also that her counsel's actions changed the outcome of the trial.
While Bell provides insight into whether defense counsel's concessions to
lesser-included offenses during trial amount to a "entire failure," it fails
to narrowly define when such concessions amount to "meaningful" ad-
versarial testing.
Following Bell, lower courts may be precluded from presuming
prejudice where defense counsel concedes guilt to lesser-included of-
fenses. This depends upon whether courts read the holding in Bell
broadly or narrowly. A broad reading of Bell would likely preclude
courts from presuming prejudice where defense counsel appeared at trial
56. Bell, 535 U.S. at 718.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, i66 (2002)).
58. Id. at 718-i9 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 653).




and contested any element of any offense. This broad reading, however,
directly conflicts with Cronic by reading the word "meaningful" out of
Cronic's second exception. So long as counsel mounts some defense, the
failure cannot be said to have occurred throughout the trial. On the other
hand, a narrow reading of Bell would include unauthorized concessions
made during opening statements. Such a concession amounts to a com-
plete failure of meaningful adversarial testing because completely re-
lieves the prosecution of its burden of proof as to the conceded offense.
Therefore, prejudice should be presumed. This latter reading of Bell is
appropriate because it adheres to the standard originally articulated in
Cronic by requiring defense counsel not merely to test the prosecution's
case, but to engage in meaningful adversarial testing.
B. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF "ENTIRE FAILURE OF
MEANINGFUL ADVERSARIAL TESTING"
Since 1984, lower courts have interpreted Cronic both broadly and
narrowly. In United States v. Swanson, the Ninth Circuit held that de-
fense counsel's decision to concede the only factual issues in dispute
amounted to a complete failure of meaningful adversarial testing, war-
ranting a presumption of prejudice under Cronic.6I In her note, The Cru-
cible of Adversarial Testing, Heidi H. Woessner contends that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Swanson represents a broad interpretation of
Cronic's second exception.62 She contrasts this with the more limited ver-
sion of the rule applied in Scarpa v. DuBois in which the First Circuit ap-
plied Strickland under similar facts, holding that defense counsel's
actions did not amount to a complete failure.6' Although these two deci-
sions represent opposite poles, both were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Bell. In addition, both cases dealt with the limited is-
sue of when defense counsel concedes guilt to all of the factual issues in
dispute.
A number of other courts have also weighed in on the application of
Cronic's second exception since the Court's decision in Bell. In Ellis v.
United States, the First Circuit, following its previous holding in Scarpa v.
DuBois, held that the only Sixth Amendment violations that fit within
the "narrowly circumscribed class" of Cronic's second exception "are
6I. 943 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. I99i).
62. Heidi H. Woessner, Note, Criminal Law- The Crucible of Meaningful Adversarial Testing:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's Guilt, 24 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 315,327-29 (2002).
63. Id. at 328-32 (discussing Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d r (ist Cir. 1994)).
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those that are pervasive in nature, permeating the entire proceeding." 64
The Third Circuit noted in Marshall v. Hendricks,
In light of Bell, we recognize that, tempted as we might be to conclude
that [defense counsel's] failure to investigate and prepare, or to take
any adversarial position or ask for mercy would, without more, consti-
tute objectively unreasonable performance, we are nonetheless con-
strained to perform the complete Strickland analysis.65
In United States v. Holman, the Seventh Circuit noted that "Cronic only
applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution's case; if
counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate
test." 66 In Freeman v. Graves, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that Strickland not Cronic applied where defense counsel had failed
to investigate and call certain alibi witnesses at trial.67 The court stated,
"[a]s we have already made clear, Cronic does not control because coun-
sel's deficiency in this case was not a complete failure to test the prosecu-
tor's case." 68 While it appears that most federal courts have read Cronic's
second exception narrowly following Bell, almost no cases have dealt
with the issue of conceding guilt to lesser-included offenses at trial.
6
,
III. CONCESSIONS OF GUILT TO LESSER OFFENSES
A. LOWER COURT HOLDINGS
A number of lower courts have considered the issue of whether
Strickland or Cronic should apply to concessions of guilt to lesser of-
fenses." While the majority of federal circuit courts have applied the
64. Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 643 (Ist Cir. 2002).
65. 307 F.3d 36, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2002).
66. 314 F.3 d 837,839 n.I (7th Cir. 2002).
67. 317 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2003).
68. Id. at got.
69. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that defense counsel's decision to concede
guilt during opening statements did not amount to a complete failure where the defendant had con-
sented to the strategy. Charm v. Mullin, 37 Fed. Appx. 475, 480 (ioth Cir. 2002).
70. See, e.g., Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that Strickland
applied to defense counsel's concessions of guilt at trial because the failure was not complete under
Cronic); United States v. Short, I81 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. i999) (holding that Strickland applied to
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel admitted guilt to lesser offenses); Lin-
gar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir. i999) (holding that Strickland applied where defense
counsel conceded guilt to second-degree murder at trial); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th
Cir. i99i) (holding that defense counsel's concessions of guilt to lesser offenses during closing argu-
ments were a reasonable trial strategy designed to enhance credibility with the jury); Osborne v.
Shillinger, 86i F.2d 612, 629 (ioth Cir. 1988) (holding, "[p]rejudice, whether necessary or not, is estab-
lished under any applicable standard" where defense counsel had likened his client and the co-
defendants to sharks feeding in the ocean in a frenzy); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla.
2000) (holding that Cronic applied where defense counsel conceded guilt to lesser offenses during
opening statements); Kansas v. Carter, 14 P.3d t138, t148 (Kan. 2000) (holding that Cronic applied
[Vol. 55:965
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Strickland standard, a number of state courts have applied Cronic.7" Of
these cases, few have dealt with the issue of concessions made during
opening statements.72
B. APPLYING STRICKLAND TO CONCESSIONS MADE DURING
OPENING STATEMENTS
In Haynes v. Cain, a Fifth Circuit decision, the government brought
first-degree murder charges against Brandon Haynes, contending that he
had kidnapped, raped, robbed, and tortured the victim before throwing
her off the roof of a Louisiana State University building." Haynes pro-
claimed his innocence despite substantial evidence against him, including
DNA evidence, videotaped surveillance footage, and a bloodstained
knife found in his car.74 During opening statements, Haynes' attorney
stated:
The evidence will show that the victim, Fang Yang, died during the
commission of a felony. It will not show that Brandon Haynes specifi-
cally intended to kill her. It will not show that he even caused her
death. In essence, the evidence will show that Brandon Haynes is guilty
of second degree murder. Nothing more. We are not going to say any-
thing less, just that, second degree murder.
We are not going to contest that Brandon Haynes raped the victim. It
was a terrible thing he did, but he did it. We are not going to contest
that. Likewise we are not going to contest the fact that he abducted her
first and brought her up to the roof. We are not contesting that. We are
not going to contest the fact that at some point he possibly robbed
her ....
... come back with a verdict of second degree murder, no more, no
less.75
Haynes' attorney went on to argue that Haynes had not formed the
specific intent to murder Yang, and that absent such proof he could not
where defense counsel conceded guilt to lesser offenses at trial); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1147
(N.H. i99i) (holding that the requirement of prejudice "need not be met because the error's severity
prevented any meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case against Anaya for accomplice
to second degree murder").
71. See supra note 72.
72. Haynes, 298 F.3d 375, Nixon, 758 So. 2d 618; Carter, 14 P.3d 1138; Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.
2d 1253 (Fla. 1995); Thompson v. State, 58I So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. i99I). If the defendant intel-
ligently and voluntarily consents to a concession of guilt, then a claim of ineffective assistance will
likely be examined under Strickland. See, e.g., Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1159 (ioth Cir. 1999);
United States v. Wilkes, 46 F.3 d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995); McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674, 676
(iith Cir. 1984): People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d ii8, 1125-26 (I11. 1989); State v. McNeill, 485 S.E.2d
284, 286 (N.C. 1997).
73. 272 F.3d 757, 758-59 (5th Cir. 2001).
74- Id.
75. Id. at 759.
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be convicted of first-degree murder.76 Following opening statements,
Haynes addressed the court outside of the presence of the jury, objecting
to his attorney's decision to concede guilt to the lesser-included offense
of second-degree murder.77 He stated to the judge:
I don't agree with what these lawyers are doing, talking about I'm
guilty of second-degree murder. I'm not guilty of second degree or first
degree. If that is the way they are going to represent me, they need to
just jump over there with the D.A.'s. They ain't representing me. Tell-
ing jurors that I'm guilty of second degree murder ain't trying to repre-
sent me in no kind of way. I disagree with what they are doing. 8
The trial court denied Haynes' requests for a new attorney, assuring
him that he had excellent lawyers and could testify if he wished.79 Haynes
did not testify, and during closing arguments, his defense counsel reiter-
ated the concessions he had made during his opening."' The jury found
Haynes guilty of first-degree murder, but deadlocked on his sentence,
and the trial judge sentenced Haynes to life imprisonment without possi-
bility of parole.8' Haynes appealed his conviction, arguing that he had re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to the unauthorized
concessions made by his lawyer during opening statements."' The Louisi-
ana appellate and supreme courts upheld Haynes' conviction."
The district court, reviewing Haynes' subsequent applications for
post-conviction relief, reversed Haynes' conviction, holding that defense
counsel's strategy of conceding guilt during opening statements resulted
in per se prejudice under Cronic.84 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court, holding that the attorney's decision to concede guilt
during opening statements against Haynes' wishes resulted in a complete
failure of meaningful adversarial testing warranting a presumption of
prejudice under Cronic.8' The court noted that where counsel acknowl-
edges the overwhelming weight of the evidence already presented
against the defendant in a closing argument, the concession amounts to a
trial tactic, which does not reach the level of ineffective assistance. 6
However, the court concluded that Haynes presented a different set of









84. Id. at 761.
85. Id. at 762-64.
86. Id. at 762.
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decision to acknowledge underlying felonies, felonies upon which the
prosecution critically relied in asking the jury to make the inferences
necessary to find Haynes guilty of first-degree murder."8 The court held
that prejudice should be presumed under Cronictt
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, holding that under Bell v.
Cone, the concessions made by Haynes's attorney did not amount to a
complete failure of meaningful adversarial testing.89 Judge Garza, writing
for the court, stated, "Haynes's defense counsel did not entirely fail to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Rather,
Haynes' attorneys acknowledged that the prosecution's evidence estab-
lishing that Haynes raped and robbed Yang was overwhelming."' The
court further concluded that because Haynes could not demonstrate a
reasonable probability that his trial would have turned out differently, he
could not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.9 The court reversed
the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus and reinstated his
conviction.2
C. APPLYING CRONIC TO CONCESSIONS MADE DURING
OPENING STATEMENTS
Two state supreme courts have applied Cronic in cases where de-
fense counsel conceded guilt to a lesser-included offense during opening
statements.93 In Nixon v. Singletary, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel where defense
counsel concedes guilt to a lesser-included offense without the defen-
dant's consent." There, the defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der, kidnapping, robbery, and arson.9' During his opening statement at
trial, Nixon's attorney stated that the victim had died a "horrible death"
and that his client caused her death.96 He went on to contest whether the
defendant had intended to cause her death, and thus, whether the defen-
dant should receive a death sentence or life imprisonment.' During clos-
87. Id. at 763-64.
88. Id. at 764.
89. Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
9o. Id. at 381-82. Judge Garza had dissented in the previous, three-judge, circuit court opinion in
Haynes. See Haynes, 272 F.3d at 765 (Garza, J., dissenting).
91. Haynes, 298 F.3d at 383.
92. Id.
93. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Florida v. Nixon, 72
U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2004) (No. 03-931); Kansas v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138. (Kan. 2000).
94. 758 So. 2d 6W8, 623 (Fla. 2000), cert. granted, Florida v. Nixon, 72 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Mar. I,
2004) (No. 03- 9 3 ).
95. Id. at 619.




ing arguments, Nixon's attorney further acknowledged his client's guilt.
98
The Florida Supreme Court held that if Nixon could establish that he did
not consent to counsel's strategy, the court would find counsel to be inef-
fective per se and Cronic would control." The court noted that, in crimi-
nal cases, "a defense attorney can, at the very least, hold the State to its
burden of proof by clearly articulating to the jury or fact-finder that the
State must establish each element of the crime charged and that a convic-
tion can only be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'" The
Nixon court further held that where the trial judge suspects that defense
counsel has conceded guilt without the defendant's consent, the court
should stop the proceeding and question the defendant on the record re-
garding the issue of consent."'
Similarly, in Kansas v. Carter, the defendant was charged with first-
degree murder, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm.' 2 At
trial, defense counsel conceded that his client was involved in the crimes,
contesting only the issue of premeditation." As the court noted, "with
Carter charged alternatively with premeditated first-degree murder or
felony murder, defense counsel's strategy was to direct the jurors toward
a felony-murder conviction rather than a premeditated first-degree mur-
der conviction."'" The defendant objected, claiming that he was innocent
of all charges and informing the trial judge that he did not believe that
his appointed counsel was representing him "to the best of his ability."'"
The trial judge denied the defendant's requests to replace defense coun-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 624-25. ("Because counsel's comments were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea,
we conclude that Nixon's claim must prevail at the evidentiary hearing below if the testimony estab-
lishes that there was not an affirmative, explicit acceptance by Nixon of counsel's strategy."). On re-
mand, the post conviction trial judge found that Nixon's failure to verbally approve or disapprove of
defense counsel's strategy constituted an approval of the concession. Nixon v. Florida, 857 So. 2d 172,
176 (Fla. 2003). On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court examined the record and concluded that no
competent, substantial evidence established that Nixon had affirmatively agreed to defense counsel's
strategy. Id. Based on the lack of evidence, the court ordered a new trial. Id. That decision is now on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Florida v. Nixon, 72 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Mar I, 2004)
(No. 03-93).
too. Nixon, 758 So. 2d. at 625.
I o i. See id.
[I]n order to avoid similar problems in the future, we hold that if a trial judge ever suspects
that a similar strategy is being attempted by counsel for the defense, the judge should stop
the proceedings and question the defendant on the record as to whether or not he or she
consents to counsel's strategy.
Id.
102. 14 P.3d 1138, 1140 (Kan. 2000).
103. Id. at 1141.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1142.
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sel.' ° At closing, defense counsel again stated that his client had acted in
a criminal manner.'" On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that
defense counsel's imposition of a guilt-based defense against a defen-
dant's wishes deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel by
relieving the prosecution of the burden proving the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.'8 Such a deprivation required a presumption of
prejudice under Cronic."9
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONCESSIONS MADE DURING OPENING
STATEMENTS AND CONCESSIONS MADE DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Concessions made during opening statements differ from conces-
sions made during closing arguments. A concession made during opening
statements relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt with regard to the conceded offense. In contrast, a
concession made during closing arguments holds the prosecution to its
burden of proof with regard to each offense, and may be more properly
characterized as an acknowledgment of overwhelming evidence already
presented against the defendant.
Under Bell, a concession made during opening statements should
amount to a complete failure of meaningful adversarial testing. As the
Court specifically noted in Cronic, "The right to effective assistance of
counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case
to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing ..... The Court
went on to state, "even when no theory of defense is available, if the de-
cision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold the prosecution to
its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ..... Bell limited
Cronic to cases in which defense counsel's actions amounted to an entire
failure of meaningful adversarial testing."2 Under the Bell standard, a
concession of guilt made during opening statements should amount to an
entire failure of meaningful adversarial testing because the prosecution is
completely relieved of its burden of proof with respect to the conceded
offense. If defense counsel does indeed have a duty to hold the prosecu-
tion to their burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Bell,
read any other way, would blatantly contradict Cronic.
io6. Id. at 1143.
107. Id.
io8. Id. at 1148.
io9. Id.
iio. U.S.v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (984).
iii. Id. at 656-57 n.i9.
112. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002).
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Concessions made during opening statements are particularly prob-
lematic in light of the underlying policy considerations of Cronic outlined
by Justice Stevens in his dissent Bell."3 According to those considera-
tions, if the review is done under Strickland, the defendant must prove
that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense
counsel's deficient performance. Where defense counsel concedes guilt
to a lesser-included offense during opening statements, she will likely not
call certain witnesses, decline to cross-examine the prosecution's wit-
nesses with regard to the conceded offense, and fail to admit hard evi-
dence related to the offense. An incomplete trial record will result, and it
will be difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant to prove prejudice."4
In contrast, a concession made during closing arguments may not
amount to an entire failure in all circumstances because the prosecution
has already presented its case. In Underwood v. Clark, the defendant was
convicted of criminal confinement with a deadly weapon and attempted
rape, and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four and forty years. " '
The evidence presented demonstrated that the defendant accosted a
woman jogging outside of town and threatened her with a knife.' 6 When
she kicked him in the groin, he fled to his car and drove away."7 Both the
victim and the motorist that followed his car identified the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime."" During closing arguments, defense coun-
sel conceded that his client was guilty of criminal confinement with a
weapon. "' Given the protracted encounter, the absence of a pre-existing
relationship, the wounds on the victim, and the eyewitness testimony, de-
fense counsel attempted to enhance the defendant's credibility with the
jury in order to focus the jury's attention on the fact that the prosecution
had not demonstrated that the defendant intended to have intercourse
with the victim. 2 '
Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted that if the lawyer had told
the jury during closing arguments that his client had decided to plead
guilty, it would constitute an involuntary guilty plea. He went on to state:
It is otherwise if in closing argument counsel acknowledges what the
course of the trial has made undeniable -that on a particular count the
113. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
114. In such cases the defendant might have been better off had his attorney slept through the en-
tire proceeding, because the prosecution will have, at the very least, been held to their burden of prov-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Fogelman, supra note 37, at 90.








evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Such acknowledgment can be a
sound tactic when the evidence is indeed overwhelming (and there is
no reason to suppose that any juror doubts this) and when the count in
question is a lesser count, so that there is an advantage to be gained by
winning the confidence of the jury.'2'
Indeed, a concession made during closing arguments may serve to gain
the credibility of the jury where the prosecution has already presented
overwhelming evidence against the defendant. Following Bell, it is
unlikely that courts will conclude that a concession, when made in light
of the evidence already presented at trial, amounts to an entire failure of
meaningful adversarial testing. Even prior to Bell, the majority of federal
courts that considered the issue concluded that the decision to concede
guilt during closing statements amounted to a trial strategy, and should
be examined under Strickland.'22
In contrast, when defense counsel concedes guilt prior to the prose-
cution having presented any evidence, the question remains whether the
strategy of preemptively gaining credibility with the jury amounts to a
constitutionally-viable alternative. The problem with such a strategy is
that, unlike a concession made during closing arguments, a concession
made during opening statements relieves the prosecution of its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the lesser-
included offense. At the very least, an entire failure of meaningful adver-
sarial testing results with regard to the that offense. A presumption of
prejudice is necessary in such situations to preserve the adversarial na-
ture of the trial process and to protect the reliability of the verdict.
While opening statements are undoubtedly not evidence, they do
have a resounding impact on the jury. As Dr. Richard Crawford has
noted, "Jurors don't seem to be able to wait for the evidence to come in;
rather, they tend to select from the two opening statements and once
121. Id. The court concluded that the lawyer had not pled guilty on behalf of the defendant, but
had merely acknowledged the overwhelming weight of the evidence already presented against the de-
fendant. Id.
122. Id.; United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Cjonceding guilt to one
count of a multi-count indictment to bolster the case for innocence on the remaining counts is a valid
trial strategy .... "); Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Because counsel's conces-
sion was a reasonable trial strategy, the concession was not deficient performance."); United States v.
Short, 18I F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[C]ounsel took the reasonable strategic approach of trying to
establish his credibility with the jury ...."); Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 1995) ("All indica-
tions lead us to conclude that the decision to concede his guilt was a rational one, formulated after a
thorough examination of every viable option and obstacle."); United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1 186,
1196 (7th Cir. i991) (holding that defense counsel's concessions did not fall below the line of reason-
able trial strategy); Messer v. Kemp, 76o F.2d io8o, io9i (iIth Cir. 1985) ("In light of the totality of
the evidence before the jury, we are simply unable to believe that the decision reached by the jury
'would reasonably likely have been different absent the [alleged] errors' in Sawhill's closing argu-
ment.") (alteration in original).
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they do that, they are apt to remain loyal all the way through jury delib-
erations."'23 A substantial majority of jurors-up to eighty percent-
make up their minds about a case after the opening statements and do
not change their minds."4 Thus, a concession made during an opening
statement can be extremely damning to the defendant, virtually ensuring
that the jury will convict on the conceded offenses. While a concession
made during closing arguments may also harm the defendant's case, it is
at least a reasonable and constitutionally-sound alternative in the face of
overwhelming evidence already presented against the defendant. For this
reason, it may not result in prejudice in all circumstances. A concession
made during opening statements, on the other hand, always results in an
inherently prejudicial outcome where the defendant has not consented to
such a strategy.
Two additional reasons exist for presuming prejudice where the de-
fendant objects to a concession of guilt to lesser-included offense. First,
the American criminal justice system places the decision about the de-
fendant's guilt in the hands of the jury. While defense counsel may be-
lieve that the defendant is guilty of a lesser-included offense, it is not
within her province, as an attorney, to determine her client's guilt and
place it before the jury. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct spe-
cifically provide that a lawyer shall not state her personal opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused."5 The determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused is for the jury, not defense counsel.
Second, the defendant retains the right to decide whether to plead
guilty or innocent to each offense. The Supreme Court has held that the
right to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty remains in the hands of the ac-
cused."' Laws governing attorney conduct also generally provide that the
123. RICHARD CRAWFORD, THE PERSUASION EDGE: WINNING PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND TRIAL
TACTICS FOR LAWYERS 104 (1989).
124. See John Eannace, An Art-Not a Science: A Prosecutor's Perspective on Opening Statements,
31 PROSECUTOR 32, 32 (Nov.-Dec. 1997) (citing Jennifer Lowis, The Opening Act: Using Your Opening
Statement to Win Your Case, CBA RECORD, Oct. 1994, at 18; WALTER BETrYRUTH, THE JURY SUMMATION
AS SPEECH GENRE: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF WHAT IT MEANS TO THOSE WHO USE IT 38-39, 208
(1988) (citing to a study which found that "eighty to ninety percent of all jurors came to a decision dur-
ing or immediately after opening statements"). But see L. Timothy Perrin, From O.J. to McVeigh: The
Use of Argument in the Opening Statement, 48 EMORY L.J. 107, 124 n.io4 (1999) (arguing that the
eighty percent figure is exaggerated and based on a misinterpretation of a study by H. Kalven and
Hans Zeisel).
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2o02).
126. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding that the defendant has ultimate author-
ity to decide whether to plead guilty); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (holding that the consti-
tutional right to plead not guilty cannot be waived by defense counsel over the defendant's objection);
see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.4 (1969) ("'A plea of guilty is more than a voluntary
confession made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need be
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decision about what plea to enter should remain in the hands of the de-
fendant. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct maintain that the
lawyer shall abide by the defendant's decision as to the plea to be en-
tered.'27 The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides that
the criminal defendant, not the lawyer, makes the decision about
whether to plead guilty 8s Even if defense counsel firmly believes that the
defendant should accept a plea bargain of a lesser sentence in exchange
for a plea of guilt to a lesser offense, defense counsel cannot unilaterally
make that decision. The defendant may still proceed to trial. The fact
that the trial process has already begun should not alter the defendant's
right. In cases where the defendant has entered a not guilty plea, and the
attorney concedes guilt to a lesser-included offense during opening
statements, she overrides the defendant's decision to pursue an "all-
innocence" defense, and the concession amounts to the "functional
equivalent of a guilty plea.' 29 Rules placing the decision to plead guilty
or innocent in the hands of the defendant exist to protect the defendant's
right to decide her own fate. These rules should apply with equal force to
concessions to lesser-included offenses because such decisions, like the
decision to plead guilty, place the defendant's liberty at risk.'30
Two final concerns are worth mentioning with regard to concessions
to lesser-included offenses at trial. First, a major concern in presuming
prejudice with regard to lesser-included offenses is that such a rule will
tie the hands of defense counsel by not allowing her to concede guilt in
order to gain credibility with the jury. For example, such a strategy might
be reasonable where the defendant is charged with possession with intent
to distribute and the evidence of possession is overwhelming. Defense
counsel decides to concede the lesser-included crime of possession, but
contests that the defendant had the intent to distribute. The decision to
concede the lesser charge may be a perfectly valid trial tactic, and may be
in the best interests of the defendant. A rule applying a presumption of
prejudice to concede during opening statements does not tie the hands of
defense counsel in such a case, however. Defense counsel can still either
advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy."') (citing Woodward v. Ala-
bama, 171 So. 2d 462,469 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965)).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(I) (2OOO).
129. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 624 (Fla. 2ooo).
130. State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1146 (N.H. I99I) ("If a jury is able to convict a defendant of a
lesser-included crime, the defendant's admission of guilt to that crime puts his or her liberty in imme-
diate, grave jeopardy. Thus, the decision to admit such guilt should remain inviolably personal to the
defendant."); Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 625 (holding that defense counsel may not make an argument that
effectively amounts to a guilty plea without defendant's consent); see also Jones v. State, 877 P.2d
1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 5o7-o8 (N.C. 1985).
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obtain the defendant's consent prior to the concession or, where the evi-
dence is overwhelming, concede the lesser-included offense during clos-
ing arguments. The rule effectuates what is in the best interest of the
defendant, while at same time requiring the prosecution to prove their
case against the defendant.
A second and final concern with rule of presuming prejudice when
an attorney concedes guilt during opening statements is that the attorney
will engage in collusion with the defendant in order to effectuate a valid
claim for ineffective assistance following the trial. While this is indeed a
valid concern, it is not limited to situations where the defense counsel
concedes guilt to lesser offenses during opening statements. In fact, this
concern applies to all ineffective assistance claims, and thus does not af-
fect the application of a rule presuming prejudice in cases where defense
counsel concedes guilt during opening statements.
D. CONCESSIONS MADE AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS, BUT DURING TRIAL
Although an in-depth discussion of rules regarding prejudice when
concessions are made during the trial is beyond the scope of this Note,
several issues are worth mentioning. The current Court, in light of Bell v.
Cone, would be unlikely to presume prejudice where a defense attorney
partially contests the prosecution's case because such a concession would
not amount to an "entire failure.' 3 ' Most courts will likely follow Judge
Posner's guiding words in Underwood v. Clark that prejudice should not
be presumed when defense counsel's concession serves as an acknowl-
edgement of the overwhelming evidence already presented against the
defendant.'32
Whereas a per se rule may be improper in cases where defense
counsel concedes guilt after opening statements, a rebuttable presump-
tion may be appropriate. In his article, The Trial For Life: Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Professor Gary Goodpaster
advocates for a rule in death penalty cases that "[c]ounsel's failure to
present any mitigating evidence should present a prima facie case of inef-
fective assistance, rebuttable only by an affirmative showing that the at-
torney did conduct appropriate investigations.""' While this rule is not
directly applicable to concessions of guilt made during trial, such a rule
131. 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (holding that the failure must be complete in order for prejudice to
be presumed under Cronic). But see Woessner, supra note 64, at 348 (arguing for the application of a
model which presumes prejudice when defense counsel concedes guilt without the defendant's consent
regardless of the time at which it takes place during the trial).
132. 939 F.2d 473,474 (7th Cir. i995).
133. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 361 (1983).
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could be modified to form a coherent approach to dealing with such con-
cessions. An unauthorized concession by defense counsel after opening
statements could constitute a prima facie case for ineffective assistance,
rebuttable only upon a showing by the government that there was indeed
overwhelming evidence against the defendant. Thus, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of ineffective assistance would result. This rule differs from
Strickland by placing the burden of proving prejudice on the government
rather than on the defendant. In cases where defense counsel concedes
guilt after opening statements, shifting the burden of demonstrating
prejudice protects the reliability of the verdict by placing an additional
check on the jury's decision to convict.
CONCLUSION
Although it is appropriate to require the defendant to prove both
deficient performance and prejudice in certain contexts, Cronic made
clear that in other contexts prejudice should be presumed. Presuming
prejudice, under the circumstances suggested in Cronic, preserves the re-
liability of the trial process by maintaining its adversarial nature. In par-
ticular, Cronic's second exception carved out such a presumption where
defense counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to mean-
ingful adversarial testing. Admittedly, when defense counsel concedes
guilt during closing arguments her actions do not amount to an entire
failure under the Court's holdings in both Cronic and Bell. Thus, a per se
rule is not warranted. When defense counsel concedes guilt during open-
ing statements, however, she completely relieves the prosecution of prov-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, defense counsel takes
the decision about the defendant's guilt as to the lesser-included offense
out of the hands of the jury by effectively entering an unauthorized guilty
plea as to the lesser-included offense on behalf of the defendant. In such
cases, a presumption of prejudice is warranted and, in fact, necessary to
preserve the adversarial nature of the process, to ensure the reliability of
the verdict, and to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel.
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